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Carrots and Sticks: Safer Fresh Produce In 
The United States Through British Style 
Supermarket Co-Regulation 
VICTORIA TOKAR* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Between late July and mid-September 2011, cantaloupes farmed 
and packed by Jensen Farms in Colorado were shipped to major retail-
ers such as Walmart and Safeway across the United States.1 By mid-
September, however, it became clear that something was seriously 
wrong. On September 12, 2011, the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (“CDC”) declared an outbreak after fifteen people in four 
different states were infected with listeriosis, which resulted in the death 
of one person.2 The CDC defines “outbreak” as “an incident in which 
two or more persons experience a similar illness resulting from the in-
gestion of a common food.”3 As the months wore on, the disease con-
tinued spreading and the death toll continued rising.4 The CDC released 
 
* This paper is for my dad, Victor Tokar. Without his love, support, and knowledge of the pro-
duce industry, I never would have been able to complete this. I love you and I miss you, pater. I 
would also like to thank my mom for letting me drone on about food safety and Professor Katie 
Pratt of Loyola Law School for her time and help.  
 1. Jensen Farms Cantaloupes—Retail Distribution Information, EFOODALERT (Nov. 17, 
2011), http://efoodalert.wordpress.com/listeria-outbreak/jensen-farms-cantaloupes-retail-
distribution-information; see also Ryan Jaslow, Listeria outbreak tied to cantaloupes triggers 
more recalls, lawsuit, CBS NEWS (Sept. 16, 2011, 9:48 AM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/listeria-outbreak-tied-to-cantaloupes-triggers-more-recalls-
lawsuit. 
 2. Investigation Announcement: Multistate Outbreak of Listeriosis Linked to Rocky Ford 
Cantaloupes, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (CDC) (Sept. 12, 2011), 
http://www.cdc.gov/listeria/outbreaks/cantaloupes-jensen-farms/091211/index.html. 
 3. Appendix B - Guidelines for Confirmation of Foodborne-Disease Outbreaks, CENTERS 
FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (CDC) (Mar. 17, 2000), 
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/ss4901a3.htm [herinafter Appendix B]. 
 4. Multistate Outbreak of Listeriosis Linked to Whole Cantaloupes from Jensen Farms, 
Colorado, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (CDC) (Aug. 27, 2012), 
http://www.cdc.gov/listeria/outbreaks/cantaloupes-jensen-farms/082712/index.html [hereinafter 
CDC, Multistate Outbreak]. 
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its final numbers from the outbreak on December 8, 2011, but had to re-
lease an updated report on August 27, 2012 to reflect the additional 
deaths and illnesses resulting from the disease.5  In sum, the outbreak 
caused 147 illnesses, thirty-three deaths, and one miscarriage across 
twenty-eight states,6 making it the deadliest outbreak of a foodborne ill-
ness that the United States has ever experienced.7 
The outbreak prompted various responses from retailers, govern-
ment agencies, and individuals impacted by the disease.  After the initial 
report of the outbreak, supermarkets began issuing recall notices;8 Jen-
sen Farms also issued a voluntary recall.9 An environmental analysis 
conducted by the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) and Colorado 
state officials found that listeria was present throughout Jensen Farm’s 
processing line, packing area, and cold storage10 
The FDA also identified several factors “likely [to have] contribut-
ed to the introduction, spread, and growth” of listeria on the canta-
loupes;11 the packing facility’s design allowed for water to pool on the 
floor, which was difficult to clean,12 and the packing equipment adjacent 
to the floors were difficult to clean as well.13 These unsanitary condi-
tions contributed to the listeria spreading despite the fact that Jensen 
Farms had received and passed a third party audit by PrimusLabs.14 
Moreover, the cantaloupes were not properly pre-cooled to remove field 
 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id.  
 7. Jane E. Allen, Tainted Cantaloupes Behind Deadliest Food-Borne Outbreak, ABC 
NEWS (Nov. 3, 2001), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/Health/cantaloupes-tied-deadliest-food-
outbreak/story?id=14874373#.UJ1Sm4b9GOJ. 
 8. Safeway Recalls Jumbo Rocky Ford Cantaloupe from Jensen Farms Sold in Five States, 
PR NEWSWIRE (Sept. 15, 2011), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/safeway-recalls-
jumbo-rocky-ford-cantaloupe-from-jensen-farms-sold-in-five-states-129926738.html. 
 9. Andy Nelson, Listeria Outbreak Pushes Rocky Ford Cantaloupes to be Pulled, PACKER 
(Sept. 12, 2011), http://www.thepacker.com/fruit-vegetable-news/fresh-produce-
retail/Cantaloupes-suspected-in-listeria-outbreak-129683568.html?view=all. 
 10. Information on the Recalled Jensen Farms Whole Cantaloupes, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG 
ADMINISTRATION (FDA) (Jan. 9, 2012),  
http://www.fda.gov/Food/RecallsOutbreaksEmergencies/Outbreaks/ucm272372.htm [hereinafter 
FDA Recalled Jensen Farms Whole Cantaloupes]. 
 11. Id.  
 12. Results of the FDA-Led Root Cause Investigation of the Multi-State Listeria Outbreak 
Related to Jensen Farms Cantaloupe, Moderator: Douglas Karas, FDA NEWSROOM (FDA) (Oct. 
19, 2011), 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/NewsEvents/Newsroom/MediaTranscripts/UCM277070.pdf 
[hereinafter Results of FDA-Led Root Cause Investigation]. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id.  
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heat before placing them into cold storage.15 Failing to pre-cool the can-
taloupes prompted listeria growth in the condensation formed on the 
fruit.16 The FDA noted that this outbreak highlights the necessity of 
“good agricultural and good handling practices” as a means to prevent 
the spread of disease.17 Jensen Farms has since filed for bankruptcy.18 
On September 26, 2013, Eric and Ryan Jensen, the owners and op-
erators of Jensen farms, were both arrested and charged with “six mis-
demeanor counts of introducing adulterated food into interstate com-
merce.”19 The brothers pled guilty to the charges and on January 28, 
2014, they were sentenced to five years of probation, six months of 
home detention, and required to pay $150,000 each in restitution.20 
There are currently up to sixty-six civil suits filed by outbreak victims 
and their family members against Jensen, Jensen’s distributor, and Pri-
mus Labs.21 
Incidents of foodborne illnesses from fresh produce in the United 
States have risen over the past few years, and while some attribute the 
increase to better detection methods and increased consumption of fresh 
produce, this increase of incidents actually highlights the gravity of the 
situation.22 The problem with addressing foodborne illness and food 
safety is that the process is reactionary. While farmers, packers, proces-
sors, shippers, and retailers have safety measures in place, food safety is 
essentially treated as a gamble through weighing the expense of safety 
measures against the potential for catastrophic economic loss if an out-
break should result. When corners are cut, the supply chain turns a prof-
it at the expense of the third parties. Without more stringent measures 
for enforcement and penalties, there is no incentive to comply with ex-
 
 15. Id. 
 16. FDA Recalled Jensen Farms Cantaloupes, supra note 10. 
 17. Id.  
 18. Michael Booth, Jensen Farms files for bankruptcy in wake of deadly listeria outbreak, 
DENVER POST (May 25, 2012), http://www.denverpost.com/breakingnews/ci_20714710/jensen-
farms-files-bankruptcy-wake-deadly-listeria-outbreak. 
 19. Chris Vanderveen, Colo. farmers arrested in listeria outbreak that killed 33, USA 
TODAY (Sept. 26, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/09/26/colorado-
cantaloupe-listeria/2877913. 
 20. Farmers Get Probation in Fatal Listeria Case, CBS (Jan. 28, 2014), 
http://denver.cbslocal.com/2014/01/28/farmers-sentenced-in-fatal-listeria-outbreak. 
 21. Coral Beach, U.S. attorney recommends probation for Jensens, PACKER (Jan. 17, 2014, 
4:51PM), http://www.thepacker.com/fruit-vegetable-news/US-attorney-recommends-probation-
for-Jensens-240915531.html. 
 22. Michael S. Rosenwald & Ylan Q. Mui, Calif. Farm Firm Linked to Tainted Spinach, 
WASH. POST (Sept. 16, 2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/09/15/AR2006091500865.html. 
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isting regulations. 
A possible model for change might be to allow for a system of co-
regulation whereby supermarkets, the last stop in the supply chain be-
fore the produce reaches the ultimate consumer, receive more freedom 
to manage and be responsible for the safety of their supply chain. Co-
regulation involves using different approaches to attack a specific prob-
lem and combines the benefits of the predictability and binding nature 
of legislation with the flexibility of self-regulation.23 In the United 
Kingdom, the system of co-regulation is currently in place and it can 
provide as a model for how co-regulation could effectively work in the 
United States.24 
This paper addresses how a co-regulation scheme in the US could 
ensure safer fresh produce. The second section considers some of the 
pathogens most commonly implicated in food-borne illness outbreaks 
caused by contaminated fresh produce and how those pathogens are in-
troduced to the produce; it also considers the significant hurdles that 
fresh produce must undergo to ensure its safety. The third section dis-
cusses current food safety schemes in the US, specifically, the newly 
implemented Food Safety Modernization Act. The fourth section then 
turns to UK law and examines how co-regulation between legislation 
and supermarkets yields safer foods. Finally, the paper discusses how a 
co-regulation scheme could effectively function in the US. 
II. CONSEQUENCES OF FOOD-BORNE ILLNESS FROM FRESH PRODUCE 
A. Illness and Death Caused by Food-Borne Pathogens 
While several pathogens affect the safety of fresh produce, there 
are three in particular that have sparked outbreaks in recent years: lis-
teria, salmonella, and Escherichia coli (“E. coli”).  Listeria causes a 
bacterial infection known as listeriosis, which typically manifests itself 
in flu-like symptoms.25 In some cases, listeria may also enter the blood 
stream and cause systemic disease, meningitis, or even the death of the 
fetus in pregnant women.26 The CDC, however, notes that listeriosis 
 
 23. Andrew Fearne & Marian Garcia Martinez, Opportunities for the Coregulation of Food 
Safety: Insights from the United Kingdom, CHOICES (2005), 
http://www.choicesmagazine.org/2005-2/safety/2005-2-04.htm. 
 24. See generally id. 
 25. BIBEK RAY & ARUN BHUNIA, FUNDAMENTALS OF FOOD MICROBIOLOGY 291 (4th ed. 
2008).  
 26. Id. at 293.  
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may also present itself in ways specific to the infected individual.27 
Healthy adults do not typically fall into serious illness from listeria in-
fections and might not even present symptoms of the disease at all.28 For 
the elderly, pregnant women, newborns, infants, and immunocompro-
mised individuals however, listeriosis can become a serious and fatal 
disease.29 During the 2011 and 2012 listeriosis outbreaks in the US, the 
median age of infected individuals were 7730 and 78,31 respectively. Lis-
teria has a mortality rate between 20-30%.32 
Part of the problem posed by listeria is its resilience and wide 
range of habitats. Listeria occurs in a variety of natural environments 
such as soil, water, dead vegetation, and human and animal feces;33 it 
can also withstand and multiply in refrigeration temperatures.34 While 
listeria outbreaks have more commonly resulted from contaminated 
meat and dairy, fresh produce such as sprouts,35 lettuce, spinach,36 rad-
ishes, potatoes, and fruits have also been found to carry listeria.37  Pro-
duce may either become contaminated in the field through the use of 
contaminated water and manure38 or be introduced later in fresh-cut 
processing facilities,39 particularly when unsanitary conditions are pre-
sent. 
The bacterium most commonly implicated in foodborne illness 
outbreaks in the US, however, is salmonella.40 Salmonella results in di-
 
 27. Appendix B, supra note 3. 
 28. RAY & BHUNIA, supra note 25, at 289. 
 29. Id.   
 30. Investigation Update: Multistate Outbreak of Listeriosis Linked to Whole Cantaloupes 
from Jensen Farms, Colorado, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (CDC) (Nov. 
2, 2011), http://www.cdc.gov/listeria/outbreaks/cantaloupes-jensen-farms/110211. 
 31. CDC, Multistate Outbreak, supra note 4.  
 32. Listeriosis, THE CENTER FOR FOOD SEC. & PUB. HEALTH (May, 2005), 
http://www.cfsph.iastate.edu/Factsheets/pdfs/listeriosis.pdf [hereinafter Listeriosis]. 
 33. RAY & BHUNIA, supra note 25, at 290.   
 34. Listeriosis, supra note 32. 
 35. Sprouts: What You Should Know, FOODSAFETY.GOV, 
http://www.foodsafety.gov/keep/types/fruits/sprouts.html (last visited July 19, 2014).   
 36. Food Press Releases, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION (FDA), 
http://www.fda.gov/AJAX/Food/default.htm?Label=Food (last visited July 18, 2014). 
 37. RAY & BHUNIA, supra note 25, at 293-94.  
 38. Renata Ivanek, Yrjo Grohn, & Martin Wiedmann, Listeria  Monocytogenes in Multiple 
Habitats and Host Populations: Review of Available Data for Mathematical Modeling, 3 
FOODBORNE PATHOGENS & DISEASE 319, 322-23 (2006), available at 
http://online.liebertpub.com/doi/pdf/10.1089/fpd.2006.3.319. 
 39. TREVOR SUSLOW & LINDA HARRIS, GUIDELINES FOR CONTROLLING LISTERIA 
MONOCYTOGENES IN SMALL- TO MEDIUM-SCALE PACKING AND FRESH-CUT OPERATIONS, Univ. of 
Cal. Agric. & Natural Res. (2000), available at http://anrcatalog.ucdavis.edu/pdf/8015.pdf. 
 40. RAY & BHUNIA, supra note 25, at 283.  
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arrhea and abdominal cramps.41 While the symptoms of salmonellosis 
appear quickly and typically last for two to three days, the individual 
can remain in a “carrier state” for months.42 Even though these infec-
tions are not typically fatal, salmonella can become deadly to infants, 
the elderly,43 and those who are already sick. Salmonella occurs natural-
ly in the gastrointestinal tracts of animals and is also present in the feces 
of humans who carry the bacteria after being infected.44 Salmonella is 
most commonly associated with meat, eggs, and dairy, but may also ap-
pear on produce because of contamination in the field or by washing 
produce in polluted water.45 
Another common foodborne pathogen is E. coli, which causes di-
arrhea, abdominal cramps, and fever.46 The bacterium occurs naturally 
in the intestinal tracts of humans, warm-blooded animals, and birds.47 
Given its gastrointestinal habitat, E. coli contamination occurs when fe-
cal matter comes directly or indirectly into contact with food.48 Sprouts 
and salad components such as spinach and lettuce, for example, can car-
ry E. coli.49 In 2006, the FDA linked California-grown spinach to a 
deadly outbreak of E. coli that sickened over 200 people in twenty-six 
states and resulted in the death of three people.50 The contamination 
likely originated in the fields where groundwater contaminated by the 
fecal matter of cattle and wild pigs came into contact with the spinach.51 
While producers and packers are able to take steps to prevent con-
taminating food with these pathogens, the consumers are often the last 
line of defense. The FDA recommends four steps towards greater food 
 
 41. Id. at 286.  
 42. Id. at 287. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 285-286.  
 45. Id. at 287. 
 46. Id. at 296.  
 47. Id. at 294.  
 48. Id. at 296. 
 49. Id. at 298.  
 50. Michael S. Rosenwald & Ylan Q. Mui, Calif. Farm Firm Linked to Tainted Spinach, 
WASH. POST (Sept. 16, 2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/09/15/AR2006091500865.html; Gitika Ahuja & Richard Besser, 3 Years 
After E. Coli Outbreak, Is Spinach Safer?, ABC NEWS (Nov. 10, 2009) 
http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/HealthyLiving/coli-spinach-salad-safe/story?id=9034833; see also 
THE FOOD SAFETY MODERNIZATION ACT: THE ROAD TO PASSAGE 27 (James William Woodlee 
ed., 2012), available at http://www.hoganlovells.com/files/Publication/85853d64-c3f2-4bc7-
9fbe-f0e3878675c1/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/751c016a-fe0f-49da-9767-
f62cc75b5b98/Hogan%20Lovells%20FDLI%20Article.pdf [hereinafter MODERNIZATION ACT]. 
 51. Ahuja & Besser, supra note 50.  
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safety for consumers: (1) by cleaning hands, surfaces, and the skins of 
fruits and vegetables; (2) by separating raw meats from other foods; (3) 
by cooking foods to the proper temperatures; and (4) by refrigerating 
foods properly.52  Cooking is the most critical step because exposure to 
high temperatures would kill listeria, salmonella, and E. coli; it can also 
act as a final check against the spread of disease from contaminated 
food.53 Unlike proteins, however, most consumers eat fresh produce raw 
or with minimal cooking; thus, the critical final check against the spread 
of foodborne illness, the “kill step,” is lacking.54 Therefore, when it 
comes to fresh produce, the consumer is wholly dependent upon the 
supply chain to ensure the safety of his or her produce. A consumer may 
know to cook chicken until it is white on the inside, but the same pre-
cautionary steps cannot be taken when it comes to lettuce and toma-
toes.55 This indicates the need throughout the supply chain for stringent 
checks against pathogens on fresh produce. 
B. Economic Damage Caused by Food-Borne Illness 
In addition to endangering human health, foodborne illness out-
breaks also cause great economic damage. According to the 2012 Cen-
sus of Agriculture, the values of sales for fruit and vegetable sales were 
$25.9 billion and $16.9 billion, respectively.56 The annual economic im-
pact of foodborne illness is estimated to reach $152 billion.57  Another 
study reconsiders the $152 billion mark and instead re-evaluates the 
cost at about $77.7 billion in “medical costs, productivity losses, and 
illness-related death[s];”58 but this alternate study did not include an 
 
 52. Safe Food Handling: What You Need to Know, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION 
(FDA), http://www.fda.gov/Food/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/ucm255180.htm (last updated 
Dec. 18, 2014).  
 53. Id. 
 54. MODERNIZATION ACT, supra note 50. 
 55. Id. at 27. 
 56. 2012 Census of Agriculture Highlights: Farm Economics, UNITED STATES DEP’T OF 
AGRIC. CENSUS OF AGRIC. (May, 2014), 
http://www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/2012/Online_Resources/Highlights/Farm_Economics
/#sales.  
 57. Foodborne Illness Costs Nation $152 Billion Annually – Nearly $39 Billion Loss At-
tributed to Produce, PRODUCE SAFETY PROJECT, http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/about/news-
room/press-releases/0001/01/01/foodborne-illness-costs-nation-$152-billion-annually-nearly-$39-
billion-loss-attributed-to-produce (last visited Jan. 24, 2015). 
 58. Helena Bottemiller, Annual Foodborne Illnesses Cost $77 Billion, Study Finds, FOOD 
SAFETY NEWS (Jan. 3, 2012), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2012/01/foodborne-illness-costs-
77-billion-annually-study-finds/#.UsncTxZDvA5 [hereinafter Annual Foodborne Illnesses Costs 
$77 Billion].  
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analysis of the impact that outbreaks have on the food industry itself, 
such as the costs resulting from loss of “consumer confidence, recall 
losses, or litigation.”59 Considering both the sheer size of the US food 
industry and the peripheral factors, it is more likely that the actual cost 
of an outbreak is much higher than $77.7 billion. 
III. FOOD SAFETY ENFORCEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 
A. Federal Regulation 
Prior to the 20th century, laws regulating the safety of food were 
practically non-existent in the United States. In 1906, President Roose-
velt signed the Food and Drug Act in the wake of Upton Sinclair’s The 
Jungle.60 The Act, a product of the Progressive Era, created the regula-
tory agency that would later become the FDA.61 The Food and Drug Act 
prohibited the manufacture or sale of misbranded or adulterated foods 
or drugs.62 While the act was a progressive step forward, it was subse-
quently replaced by the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 
(“FDCA”).63 The FDCA further clarified the existing powers of the 
FDA, such as the ability to conduct factory inspections.64 Today, the 
FDA continues to administer the heavily amended FDCA by inspecting 
facilities, developing testing standards and procedures, and enforcing its 
regulations.65 
 
 
 
 59. Id. 
 60. FDA History - Part I, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION (FDA) (Jun. 18, 2009) 
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/Origin/ucm054819.htm (although Sinclair 
intended to expose the horrors of wage slavery and the suffering of immigrants working in the 
Chicago stockyards, the American public was thrown into uproar over the food handling practices 
instead); Karen Olsson, Welcome to The Jungle, SLATE (July 10, 2006), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/arts/books/2006/07/welcome_to_the_jungle.html (The Jungle de-
scribes the cost-cutting practices of the meat packing factories, including cleaning scraps of meat 
from floor traps and adding it to other processed meat and the slaughter of cows unfit for con-
sumption after distracting the inspectors); UPTON SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE 65-66 (Buccaneer 
Books, Inc., 1984) (1906) (report by government investigators confirmed the unsanitary condi-
tions in the Chicago stockyards); see H.R. DOC. NO. 59-873 at 266 (1906).  
 61. FDA History - Part I, supra note 60 (the FDA actually grew out of the USDA’s Bureau 
of Chemistry, but the FDA itself considers the Food and Drug Act to be its founding document). 
 62. Federal Food and Drug Act, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768-772 1 (1906) (codified as 21 U.S.C. § 
1-15 (1934), repealed by 21 U.S.C. § 329(a) (1938)).  
 63. FDA History - Part I, supra note 60. 
 64. Id. 
 65. RAY & BHUNIA, supra note 25, at 468. 
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The FDCA itself prohibits the introduction or receipt of any adul-
terated or misbranded food into interstate commerce.66 The act defines 
“adulterated food” as any food that “bears or contains any poisonous or 
deleterious substance . . . render[ing] it injurious to health.”67 To help 
prevent adulterated food from entering interstate commerce and causing 
injury, the FDCA sets forth requirements for facilities that handle 
foods.68 For violations, the FDCA allows for penalties of no more than a 
year’s imprisonment, a fine that does not exceed $1,000, or both.69 
B. The Food Safety Modernization Act of 2010 
In December 2010, Congress passed the FDA Food Safety Mod-
ernization Act (“FSMA”), an amendment to the FDCA.70 In January 
2011, President Obama signed the FSMA into law.71 The FSMA up-
dates the safety standards of the FDCA and strives to take a preventa-
tive rather than reactionary approach to food safety.72 To achieve this, 
the FSMA granted more powers to the FDA.73 Key among the FDA’s 
expanded powers are the abilities to mandate recalls of unsafe foods, 
require that certain facilities implement preventive control schemes, set 
forth safety standards for produce, and establish a program for laborato-
ry accreditation for food testing.74  The FSMA also extends to imported 
food; importers are directed to establish foreign supplier verification 
programs.75 The FDA must also inspect facilities on a schedule based on 
risk factors, and the facilities must give the FDA access to their rec-
ords.76 
Section 103 of the FSMA amends the FDCA by adding a require-
ment that facilities engaged in manufacturing, processing, packing, or 
holding food identify “reasonably foreseeable hazards” and implement 
preventive controls against them.77 Potential hazards may be biological 
 
 66. 21 U.S.C. § 331(a-c) (Jan. 7, 2011). 
 67. 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(1) (Jan. 3, 2012). 
 68. 21 U.S.C. § 331(uu) (Jan. 7, 2011). 
 69. 21 U.S.C. § 333(a)(1) (Jan. 7, 2011). 
 70. FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-353, 124 Stat. 3885 (2011). 
 71. Background on the FDA Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA), U.S. FOOD AND DRUG 
ADMINISTRATION (FDA), http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/PublicHealthFocus/ucm239907.htm 
(last visited July 20, 2014). 
 72. See generally id. 
 73. Id.at 1. 
 74. Id. at 1-2.  
 75. Id. at 1.  
 76. FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, supra note 70, §§ 101 and 201. 
 77. Id. § 103 (a-b).  
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or chemical, including those that occur naturally and those introduced 
intentionally.78 Under this section, facility operators, who are in the best 
position to evaluate the risks associated with their own operations,79 are 
required to take charge of ensuring the efficacy of these measures and 
correcting improperly implemented or ineffective measures.80  The 
FSMA promotes its goal of preventive food safety by stating that a fa-
cility must periodically reanalyze its plan in response to “new and 
emerging threats” in addition to any changes in the facility.81 Given the 
possibility of facilities developing too many standards, the FSMA also 
charged the FDA “to establish science-based minimum standards for 
conducting a hazard analysis . . . implementing preventive controls, and 
documenting the implementation of the preventive controls.”82 
Section 211 expands the 2007 FDCA Reportable Food Registry 
amendment. The registry allows parties to report food that has a reason-
able probability of causing serious injury or death to humans or ani-
mals.83 While these reports do not necessarily prevent contaminated 
foods from entering the supply chain, they are invaluable links in a 
chain of traceability and make containment of the problem easier. On 
the more preventive side, section 201 gives the FDA the authority to 
conduct scheduled inspections of facilities based on the amount of risk a 
food carries with it.84 
In setting forth these new authorities and mandates, the FSMA 
provided specific deadlines that these mandates needed to be imple-
mented: (1) no later than ninety days after signing to establish a “con-
sumer-friendly search engine with recall information;”85 (2) no later 
than eighteen months after signing for the FDA to establish its hazard 
control guidelines and for facilities to implement hazard controls;86 and 
 
 78. Id. § 103 (b)(1-2).  
 79. Letter from Robert J. Whitaker, Chief Science and Technology Officer Produce Market-
ing Association, to Food and Drug Administration (Aug. 22, 2011), available at 
http://xchange.pma.com/PMA/Communities/Resources/ViewDocument/?DocumentKey=3c2918
4d-ea61-469a-8cc0-89dfe1f76f0e&ssopc=1. 
 80. FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, supra note 70, § 103(d-e). 
 81. Id. § 103(f)(5). 
 82. 21 U.S.C. § 350g(n) (Jan. 3, 2012) (codified as amended and incorporated in the FDA 
Food Safety Modernization Act at § 103).  
 83. Id. § 101(a)(4).   
 84. See generally id. § 201. 
 85. Hogen Lovells, Summary of Key Effective Dates, GROCERY MANUFACTURERS 
ASSOCIATION (Feb. 2011), http://www.gmaonline.org/file-
manager/Food_Safety/Summary_of_Key_FSMA_Effective_Dates.pdf. 
 86. FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, supra note 70, §103. 
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finally, (3) no later than two years from signing for the FDA to establish 
its laboratory accreditation program and accreditation system for third-
party auditors.87 
C.  Ineffectiveness of the FSMA 
Despite the FSMA’s good intentions and deadlines, several sec-
tions of the law have not yet gone into effect.88 Namely, the FDA has 
missed its preventive control deadline by more than six months and has 
yet to release a science-based minimum standard for safety measures, a 
turn of events that has left the food industry and food safety advocates 
confused.89 Groups such as the Grocery Manufacturers Association 
(“GMA”) and the Snack Food Association, joined by several other in-
dustry groups, sent letters in May 2012 inquiring when the FDA would 
begin enforcing the rules or whether the enforcements would be delayed 
until the final rules were settled.90 In its response to these letters, the 
FDA stated that it expected compliance with the FSMA’s requirements 
within the timeframes outlined in the final rules and that until then, the 
food safety provisions of the FDCA remain in effect.91  Despite the 
FDA’s response, lawyers for the GMA recommended that regardless of 
whether the FDA finalizes the rules, facilities should nevertheless insti-
tute preventive controls to comply with the FSMA.92 On August 29, 
2012, the Center for Food Safety filed a lawsuit in the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of California against the FDA 
and the Office of Management and Budget, alleging that the delays in 
implementing the law are unlawful.93 The case settled and the FDA 
agreed to set publication dates for the final rules and implement the 
FSMA in 2015 and 2016.94 There is also concern that the FSMA will be 
 
 87. Id.  
 88. Helena Bottemiller, More Deadlines Missed as FSMA Rules Remain Stalled at OMB, 
FOOD SAFETY NEWS (July 2, 2012), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2012/07/more-deadlines-
missed-as-fmsa-rules-remain-stalled-at-omb/#.Unvh4vlQEoo. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id.  
 91. Michael R. Taylor, Response to Letter from Grocery Manufacturers Association, U.S. 
FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION (FDA) (June 18, 2012), 
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofFoods/CFSAN/CFSANFOIAElectronicR
eadingRoom/ucm310084.htm. 
 92. See Bottemiller, supra note 88. 
 93. Complaint for Plaintiff at 3, Ctr. for Food Safety v. Hamburg, No. CV 12.4529 (N.D. 
Cal. 2012), available at http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/files/2012-08-29-fsma-complaint-
filed_78450.pdf. 
 94. Lydia Zuraw, FSMA Gets New Deadlines for Final Rules, FOOD SAFETY NEWS, (Feb. 
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more expensive to implement than anticipated. When the FSMA was 
enacted, the Congressional Budget Office estimated that the FDA would 
require an additional $583 million over its fiscal year 2010 base to im-
plement the bill; the FDA now estimates that it will require an increase 
of $400-$450 million over its fiscal year 2012 funding to implement the 
FSMA.95 
A fundamental flaw in the FSMA’s management scheme is its in-
sistence on the upstream management of the supply chain. The FSMA 
mandates factories, warehouses, and establishments that manufacture, 
process, pack, or hold food to put into place hazard analyses and pre-
ventive controls to ensure the safety of the food the facility handles.96 
While preventative measures have a positive effect and should be pro-
moted, downstream management through co-regulation could actually 
work to ensure more uniform safety standards throughout the supply 
chain. Supermarkets, the last stop in the supply chain before the con-
sumer, are actually the best situated to manage and maintain the entire 
length of their supply chains by setting forth specific standards for pro-
cessors, packers, and shippers to follow. Furthermore, given the sheer 
volume of produce that supermarkets sell and the vast numbers of con-
sumers they sell to, supermarkets take on a great deal of risk. Thus, 
holding supermarkets to a strict liability standard would be appropriate. 
D. Civil Litigation as an Enforcement Strategy 
Civil litigation has not been enough to effectuate the necessary 
changes to bring about safer produce or even safer food in general. Liti-
gation over foodborne illness is rare and most cases involve meat; case 
decisions involving fresh produce are practically nonexistent. Litigating 
over foodborne illness can be a murky process involving several barri-
ers. First, the particular bacteria that caused the illness must be identi-
fied, and the plaintiff must demonstrate that consuming a particular food 
item caused them to ingest that bacterium, making them ill.97 Because 
symptoms of foodborne illnesses often mimic common gastrointestinal 
 
21, 2014), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2014/02/fsma-gets-new-deadlines-for-final-
rules/#.UxJOlNF3vIU.  
 95. KATHLEEN SEBELIUS, ENSURING A SAFE FOOD SUPPLY: A REPORT TO CONGRESS UNDER 
THE FDA FOOD SAFETY MODERNIZATION ACT SECTION 110(A)(1), U.S. Food and Drug Admin-
istration (FDA) (Apr. 2013), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Food/GuidanceRegulation/FSMA/UCM351876.pdf. 
 96. See 21 U.S.C. § 350(g) (2012). 
 97. David Polin, Proof of Liability for Food Poisoning, 47 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D § 
1, § 18 (1998). 
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illnesses like the flu, foodborne illness can often go undetected.98 Even 
if a plaintiff can establish that it was a bacterium like salmonella that 
made him ill, he may still encounter difficulty establishing that eating a 
particular food caused him to get sick.99 Assuming that the individual is 
able to overcome these hurdles, another obstacle is that the plaintiff 
must still bring the proper defendant to court, which can be challenging 
when the consumer only knows that he bought (or ate) the tainted pro-
duce from the grocer or restaurant.100 
The plaintiff must identify the rest of the supply chain. Even if the 
individual can name each of the links in the supply chain as defendants, 
this can lead to seemingly odd distributions of fault.101 This, however, is 
not always the case. The dispute in In re Shigellosis Litigation involved 
indemnifying a restaurant for a $1 million arbitration liability after the 
restaurant customer ate parsley tainted with shigella.102 This case also 
demonstrated the fact that many foodborne illness cases are often settled 
out of court. For example, the 2006 E. coli outbreak associated with 
Earthbound Farms spinach resulted in several settlements, including a 
$42,750 award for a seven-year-old child placed in intensive care.103 
Accordingly, while produce companies may find it simply cheaper to 
gamble the occasional settlement payouts than invest in safety mecha-
nisms,104 this approach is undesirable because it is inherently reactionary 
rather than preventative. The ultimate deterrence and prevention of ill-
ness and death resulting from tainted produce is preferable to paying a 
settlement amount ex post facto.105 
Finally, even the primary tool in the plaintiff’s toolbox in cases 
like this, strict liability, can oftentimes be altered to the negligence 
 
 98. Id.  
 99. Id.  
 100. Brian Dalusio, Note, Is the Meat Here Safe? How Strict Liability for Retailers Can Lead 
to Safer Meat, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1081, 1107-8 (2010), available at  
http://www.bu.edu/law/central/jd/organizations/journals/bulr/documents/DALUISO.pdf. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Shigella - Shigellosis, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (CDC), 
http://www.cdc.gov/shigella/index.html (last updated Aug. 12, 2014); In re Shigellosis Litig., 647 
N.W.2d 1 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002). Shigella is a bacterium that causes diarrhea, fever, and stomach 
cramps in humans. The bacteria may be present on fresh produce that was harvested from a field 
with sewage on it or was cross-contaminated due to poor handler hygiene.   
 103. Geoffrey Fattah, Utahn settles suit over tainted spinach, DESERET NEWS (Aug. 25, 
2007), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/695204185/Utahn-settles-suit-over-tainted-
spinach.html. 
 104. Dalusio, supra note 100, at 1101.  
 105. See generally Gerald F. Tietz, Strict Products Liability, Design Defects and Corporate 
Decision-Making: Greater Deterrence through Stricter Process, 38 VILL. L. REV. 1361 (1993).  
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standard in disguise.106 A majority of courts uses the reasonable-
expectations test, which asks the jury to determine whether a “reasona-
ble consumer” would have expected E. coli to be on the plaintiff’s pro-
duce.107 Brian Dalusio notes a split in the way courts have handled cases 
involving trichinosis,108 a parasitic disease contracted by consumers of 
home-cooked pork.109  While some courts held that it was unreasonable 
to expect all consumers who cook at home to ensure that all parts of the 
meat were thoroughly cooked, others have declined to follow this rea-
soning and rigidly held that trichinosis cannot be contracted through 
thoroughly cooked meat, placing the responsibility onto the consum-
er.110 While this reasoning may be applied to meat, which is most com-
monly consumed after cooking, it does not hold for fresh produce, 
which is commonly consumed raw. A consumer who may “reasonably 
expect” an undercooked piece of pork to contain Trichinella is unlikely 
to regard his salad components with similar suspicion. By making it 
more difficult for plaintiffs to succeed in cases against defendants in 
foodborne illness cases, assuming those cases are brought up at all, the 
threat of civil litigation as a means to encourage food safety loses its 
teeth. 
IV. THE UNITED KINGDOM’S APPROACH TO FOOD SAFETY 
In contrast, food safety legislation in the UK takes a dynamic ap-
proach. Instead of fighting upstream through the supply chain, the UK’s 
legislation encourages retailers to take responsibility for the safety of 
food supplied from their suppliers and incentivizes proper manage-
ment.111 This method of co-regulation of food safety between the gov-
ernment and supermarkets is supported by the flexibility of both the leg-
islation and the markets themselves. 
As a member of the European Union (“EU”), the UK’s food safety 
laws have two sources: those set forth by EU regulations and those cre-
 
 106. Dalusio, supra note 100, at 1106.  
 107. Id.; see O’Dell v. De Jean’s Packing Co., Inc., 585 P.2d 399, 401 (Okla. App. 1978). 
 108. Parasites—Trichinellosis: Epidemiology & Risk Factors, CDC 
http://www.cdc.gov/parasites/trichinellosis/epi.html (last updated Aug. 8, 2012). Trichinosis is a 
parasitic disease caused by the consumption of Trichinella parasites which may be found in raw 
or undercooked pork and wild game meat. 
 109. Dalusio, supra note 100, at 1102-03.  
 110. Id.  
 111. See generally Jill E. Hobbs, Andrew Fearne & John Spriggs, Incentive Structures for 
Food Safety and Quality Assurance: An International Comparison, 13 FOOD CONTROL 77, 77-78 
(2002), available at http://www.wavfh.ulg.ac.be/pdf/food_safety_legislation.pdf. 
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ated by the UK itself.112  Food safety in both the UK and the EU under-
went drastic changes in the late 1990’s due to the bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy (“BSE”) (also known as the “mad cow disease” crisis) 
in the UK and other food-borne illness outbreaks in EU countries.113 
Food law became less concerned with free trade and shifted its focus on 
risk analysis and traceability.114 In 2002, the European Council passed 
Regulation 178/2002, which created the independent European Food 
Safety Authority (“EFSA”) to oversee risk assessment.115 Regulation 
178/2002 applies broadly across the food industry; it defines “food 
business” as “any undertaking . . . carrying out any of the activities re-
lated to any stage of production, processing, and distribution of food.”116  
While the regulation does mandate that member states have in place a 
system of official controls to enforce food law and ensure compliance 
by food businesses, it also places responsibilities on the food businesses 
themselves to meet the regulation’s requirements and to maintain trace-
ability systems.117 
A. The Food Safety Act of 1990 
The UK enacted the Food Safety Act of 1990 (“Food Safety Act”) 
in order to bring the nation into compliance with the European Commis-
sion’s directives on food safety issued in the 1980’s.118 In 2004, the 
Food Safety Act was amended to bring the UK in line with Regulation 
178/2002.119 On a basic level, the Food Safety Act contains provisions 
broadly similar to those in the FDCA. For instance, the Food Safety Act 
 
 112. MICHAEL BATZ & J. GLENN MORRIS JR., THE PRODUCE SAFETY PROJECT AT 
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY, BUILDING THE SCIENCE FOUNDATION OF A MODERN FOOD SAFETY 
SYSTEM: LESSONS FROM DENMARK, THE NETHERLANDS, AND THE UNITED KINGDOM ON CREATING 
A MORE COORDINATED AND INTEGRATED APPROACH TO FOOD SAFETY INFORMATION, Produce 
Safety Project 45-46, (May 10, 2010), 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/phg/content_level_pages/reports/PSPRP
TBuildingtheSciencepdf.pdf. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 47. 
 115. Council Regulation 178/2002, art. 22, 23, 2002 O.J. (L 31/1) (EC). 
 116. Id. art. 2.  
 117. Id. arts. 17,18.  
 118. John Humphrey, Food Safety, Private Standards Schemes and Trade: The Implications 
of the FDA Food Safety Modernization Act 16-19, INSTITUTE OF DEV. STUDIES, Working Paper 
No. 403 (Sept. 2012), available at http://www.ids.ac.uk/files/dmfile/Wp403.pdf.   
 119. Commission General Food Law Regulation 178/2002: Guidance Notes on the Food 
Safety Act of 1990 (Amendment) Regulations 2004 and the General Food Regulations 2004, Oct. 
3, 2005 O.J. (C Version 2.0) 
http://www.food.gov.uk/multimedia/pdfs/generalfoodsafetyguide2.pdf.  
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and the FDCA both seek to control foods that could be hazardous to 
human health.120 To protect the food supply, the Food Safety Act grants 
authorities the power to seize foods “likely to cause food poisoning or 
any disease communicable to human beings.”121 This is similar to how 
the FDCA grants the FDA the power to seize foods that run afoul of the 
FDCA’s provisions.122 Both the Food Safety Act and the FDCA penalize 
violations with fines or imprisonment for a period of months.123 
Unlike the FDCA, the Food Safety Act contains broader language 
and offers a due diligence defense.124 When determining whether a party 
is guilty of an offense, the Food Safety Act uses a reasonableness stand-
ard.125 For instance, under section 8 of the Food Safety Act, for the pur-
poses of defining food that is not compliant with safety standards, the 
Food Safety Act states that food is not in compliance if: 
(a) [I]t has been rendered injurious to health by means of [add-
ing substances to the food, using a substance as an ingredi-
ent in food preparation, abstracting constituents from the 
food, and processing or treating the food]; 
(b) it is unfit for human consumption; or 
(c) it is so contaminated . . . that it would not be reasonable to 
expect it to be used for human consumption in that state.126 
In determining when food is rendered injurious to health, the Food 
Safety Act states that one must consider both the “probable effect of 
that food” on the consumer’s health and the “probable cumulative ef-
fect” of the food on the consumer’s health.127 The words “reasonable” 
and “probable” introduce an element of reasonable care to food safety 
that is absent from both the FDCA and the FSMA. This also lends itself 
to the due diligence defense that the Food Safety Act introduced. Prior 
to the Food Safety Act, UK law provided a “warranty” defense for food 
safety violations; this only required buyers in the supply chain to “prove 
the food was not compromised while under their control.”128 Under sub-
section 21 of the Food Safety Act, however, it is a defense to a charge 
 
 120. 21 U.S.C. § 334(a) (2012). 
 121. Food Safety Act of 1990, c.16 § 7 (1990) (U.K.). 
 122. 21 U.S.C. § 334(a) (2012). 
 123. Food Safety Act of 1990, supra note 121, § 35. 
 124. Hobbs et al., supra note 111. 
 125. Food Safety Act of 1990, supra note 121, §§ 7-8.  
 126. Id.  
 127. Id. § 7.  
 128. Hobbs et al., supra note 111, at 78. 
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under the Act for a person to “prove that he took all reasonable precau-
tions and exercised all due diligence to avoid the commission of the of-
fence by himself or by a person under his control.”129 
The Food Safety Act also details how a person can satisfy the re-
quirements of the subsection, such as proving that he carried out rea-
sonable checks of the food or that it was reasonable to rely upon the 
supplier’s checks; not knowing (or not having any reason) to suspect 
that the act was an offense; or showing that the offense was due to the 
act of someone outside of the defendant’s control.130 
By removing the warranty defense and instituting a due diligence 
defense, the UK incentivized buyers to take an active role in managing 
the safety of their food and sellers to demonstrate that they could supply 
safe food that would not expose the buyer to strict liability.131 Further-
more, since the reasonableness standard is so vague, retailers such as 
supermarkets have instituted their own strict standards for policing the 
safety of their supply chains.132 The Food Safety Act’s broad standards, 
in essence, encouraged retailers to fill in the gaps themselves in order to 
limit their liability and co-regulate.133 Since implementing co-regulation, 
food safety in the UK has improved.134 
A. Supermarket Regulatory Schemes and Private Regulatory Schemes 
In 2002, the Policy Commission on the Future of Farming and 
Food released its report discussing its ideals for reshaping the food in-
dustry in England.135 The Policy Commission emphasized the need for 
the individual links in food supply chains, specifically, the retailers, to 
be full participants in order to cater best to consumers.5 Without specific 
guidelines from the government to follow, UK supermarkets such as 
Tesco and Marks and Spencer have implemented their own standards 
for regulating the safety of their supply chains.136 These standards are 
 
 129. Food Safety Act of 1990, supra note 121, § 21. 
 130. Id.  
 131. Hobbs et al., supra note 111, at 78. 
 132. Id.  
 133. Id.  
 134. Fearne & Martinez, supra note 23.   
 135. See generally SIR DONALD CURRY ET AL., FARMING & FOOD - A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE  
(Crown Copyright 2002), available at 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100807034701/http:/archive.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/far
ming/pdf/PC%20Report2.pdf [hereinafter FARMING & FOOD A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE]. 
 136. See TERRENCE WILDE, TESCO FOOD MANUFACTURING STANDARD (TESCO STORES 
LTD., VERSION 4.0 2010), available at http://www.itesco.cz/Files/dokumenty-ke-stazeni/pro-
dodavatele/tesco_food_manufacturing_standard_en; Field to Fork Assessment at the Heart of 
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ambitious and encompass the entirety of the supply chain, from the farm 
to the ultimate consumer.137 Tesco, the third-largest retailer in the world, 
applies its standard to “all primary and secondary food suppliers” and 
establishes detailed requirements for all types of food manufacturing.138  
Tesco distinguishes between different levels of risk associated with dif-
ferent foods and how food is handled at different stages of manufactur-
ing; recognizes that risk levels change throughout the process;139 and al-
so adopts the Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points (“HACCP”) 
plan for processing steps.140 
Marks and Spencer, another large British retailer, also developed 
its own fresh produce assurance standard called Field to Fork in 2002.141 
Field to Fork sets standards ranging from the permissible levels of pes-
ticides used on crops to the minimum labor standards on farms.142 Field 
to Fork divides produce into four risk groups ranging from Category 1, 
the highest risk to consumers for produce items typically consumed raw 
such as salad greens, to Category 4, the lowest risk, for produce items 
like potatoes and squashes that are almost always cooked before con-
sumption.143 
While certain stores have established their own assurance pro-
grams, other retailers subscribe to standards set by groups such as the 
British Retail Consortium (“BRC”) and GLOBALG.A.P.144 These pro-
grams develop safety standards and allow subscribing retailers and sup-
pliers who meet those standards to use their program logo to indicate 
that they are in compliance.145 Under the BRC model, a supplier who 
wishes to become certified may order a copy of the Standard to conduct 
 
Continuous Improvement at Marks & Spencer, QUICKFIRE CASE STUDIES, available at 
http://www.salis-it.com/tl_files/salis-it/pdf/CaseStudy_Quickfire_MS.pdf (last visited on July 18, 
2014) [hereinafter Field to Fork Assessment]. 
 137. See WILDE, supra note 136, at 69. 
 138. Id. at 3.  
 139. Id. at 3-4. 
 140. Id. at 8.  
 141. M&S Revises Field to Fork Assurance, AGRIFOOD STANDARDS (May 31, 2007), 
http://www.agrifoodstandards.net/es/news/global/m_s_revises_field_to_fork_assurance.html. 
 142. Id.  
 143. Field to Fork Assessment, supra note 136, at 2. 
 144. See Producer & Supplier Members, GLOBALG.A.P., 
http://www.globalgap.org/uk_en/who-we-are/members/supplier/ (last visited on Nov. 4, 2013) 
[hereinafter Producer & Supplier Members]; How to Gain Certification, BRC GLOBAL 
STANDARDS, 
http://www.brcglobalstandards.com/Manufacturers/Food/Gettingstarted/Review.aspx#.U-
hGV_ldUnc (last visited Feb. 14, 2012). 
 145. See Producer & Supplier Members, supra note 144. 
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a self-assessment to identify areas that could use improvement before a 
full audit.146 After self-assessment, the supplier goes through an audit 
and is then given a list of areas to be improved.147 After corrective ac-
tion is taken, the BRC’s Certification Body reviews the reports and is-
sues a certification decision.148 GLOBALG.A.P. operates in a similar 
manner by publishing standards and checklists for producers.149 Here, 
producers have the opportunity to conduct self-audits before official au-
dits are carried out by certified auditing groups.150 GLOBALG.A.P. also 
certifies Farm Assurers to act as consultants to producers undergoing 
the certification process.151 For the buyers’ benefit, GLOBALG.A.P 
maintains databases of certified suppliers.152 
Another standard used is the Red Tractor Assurance (“Red Trac-
tor”), owned by Assured Food Standards and developed in Britain in 
2000.153 This scheme focuses on meat, dairy, and fresh produce from 
Britain; it also provides standards for the supply chain from the farm to 
the packer.154 Products that meet the standard may display the Red Trac-
tor logo on their packaging.155 The logo features the eponymous “Red 
Tractor” and a Union Jack.156 Several grocery chains use this standard; it 
is also the most widely used standard of compliance in the UK with ap-
proximately 60% of shoppers recognizing the logo.157 The logo is key to 
consumer outreach because it allows shoppers to know at a glance that 
the produce before them originated in the UK and adhered to a known 
safety and traceability standard.158 
 
 146. How to Gain Certification, supra note 144; FRUITS AND VEGETABLES, available at 
http://www.globalgap.org/export/sites/default/.content/.galleries/documents/120813-
InfoKIT_FV_web_en.pdf (last visited Jan. 29, 2014). 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id.  
 149. What We Do, GLOBALG.A.P., http://www.globalgap.org/uk_en/what-we-do (last visit-
ed Feb. 12, 2015). 
 150. Aaron Crowe, Biggest Grocery Store Markups: The Worst Deals in the Aisles, DAILY 
FINANCE (Feb. 22, 2011), http://www.dailyfinance.com/2011/02/18/biggest-grocery-store-
markups/. 
 151. Farm Assurers, GLOBALG.A.P., http://www.globalgap.org/uk_en/what-we-do/the-gg-
system/gg-farm-assurers/ (last visited July 19, 2014). 
 152. Source Certified Products, GLOBALG.A.P., 
http://www.globalgap.org/uk_en/buyers/Sourcing-Certified-Products (last visited June 30, 2014). 
 153. ASSURED FOOD STANDARDS, Red Tractor Labeling Audit 4 (May 2012), available at 
http://www.redtractor.org.uk/documentdownload.axd?documentresourceid=65. 
 154. Id.  
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id.  
 158. Id. 
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B. Drawbacks to Co-Regulation Schemes 
Despite the many benefits of co-regulation, there are also certain 
drawbacks. Co-regulation schemes work best when the businesses issu-
ing the regulations actually have the resources and interest to regulate.159 
Overseeing the entirety of the supply chain is costly and some super-
markets might find themselves responding to food safety issues by ei-
ther raising prices or even ceasing to carry certain products deemed too 
risky.160 Major American retailers Kroger and Walmart, for example, 
have stopped carrying fresh bean sprouts, broccoli sprouts, and alfalfa 
sprouts because they have a high risk of being contaminated with path-
ogens.161 Producers and processors might also find themselves in a bad 
position due to such oversight if they simply cannot afford to make 
changes to their operations. As a result, producers are divided and now 
have lower bargaining power.162 In this scenario, producers and proces-
sors may decide it is simply not worth dealing with the demands of 
large retailers.163 
Avoiding this problem requires evolving with the changing land-
scape. The Policy Commission recognized that chain-wide participation 
would not work with “thousands of individual farmers around the table” 
and suggested that the farmers band together in order to negotiate more 
efficiently and effectively with processors and retailers.164 Rather than 
cutting producers’ concerns out of the equation, the Policy Commission 
saw room for them at the bargaining table because they are a crucial 
part of the supply chain.165 
The Policy Commission realized, however, that there are certain 
barriers to collaboration that can prove difficult to farmers seeking to 
form cooperatives. Smaller producers and processors could form alli-
ances with other producers and processors in order to pool resources 
and gain a stronger voice at the table with large retailers.166 Many UK 
 
 159. See generally id.  
 160. See e.g. Elizabeth Weise, Kroger stores stop selling sprouts as too dangerous, USA 
TODAY (Oct. 20, 2012), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2012/10/19/kroger-bans-sprouts-
too-dangerous/1645147/. 
 161. Id. (Between 1990 and 2010, there have been at least 46 outbreaks linked to sprouts).  
 162. Consumers International, The relationship between supermarkets and suppliers: What 
are the implications for consumers? 5, available at http://www.europe-
economics.com/publications/the_relationship_between_supermarkets_and_suppliers.pdf.  
 163. FOOD SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT 147 (Michael A. Bourlakis & Paul W.H. Weight-
man eds., 2004).  
 164. FARMING & FOOD - A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE, supra note 135, at 32.  
 165.  See id. 
 166. Id. at 34.  
TOKAR_FINAL_FOR_PUB 4/4/2015  1:58 PM 
2015] Safer Fresh Produce In The United States 507 
 
fresh fruit producers already belong to or are shareholders in co-ops 
which act as intermediaries between the producers and the grocery re-
tailers.167 
Although the British government has taken a step back from ag-
gressively regulating the food industry, it has made efforts to address 
the power disparity between suppliers and large retailers. Investigations 
by the Competition Commission revealed unfair practices by retailers; 
as a result, the Groceries Supply Code of Practice (“GSCOP”) was re-
leased in 2009 to address these problems.168 The GSCOP, which re-
placed an earlier code of practice, applies to certain designated retailers 
including Tesco, Waitrose, Marks & Spencer, and any retailer with a 
turnover exceeding £1 billion in supply of groceries in the UK.169 These 
designated retailers are required to incorporate the GSCOP into their 
supply agreements.170 Responsibilities of buyers under the GSCOP in-
clude: a duty of fair dealing, giving reasonable notice to suppliers of 
changes to supply chain procedures, and compensating the supplier for 
costs incurred as a result of failing to give reasonable notice.171 Disputes 
under the GSCOP would be settled through arbitration.172 Choosing to 
resolve disputes through arbitration indicates that the industry should 
handle its affairs internally rather than wait for a government referee. 
Private regulation standards coupled with legislation provide a 
cost-effective way for a nation to maintain the safety of its food supply 
by shifting the costs of regulation onto businesses173 while giving indus-
try players the flexibility to manage their own affairs. Retailers have a 
more intimate relationship with their suppliers than the government and 
as such, are in the best position since they know their own requirements 
and the concerns of their suppliers. Because problems that arise can 
translate into loss of profits, retailers have a great incentive to address 
issues quickly and efficiently in a manner that makes the most sense for 
that relationship. Instead of a one-size fit all approach, retailers are en-
couraged by this arrangement to develop their own individualized solu-
 
 167. Id. at 34-35. 
 168. See generally Groceries Code Adjudicator Act, 2012-13, c.19 (U.K.).  
 169. GSCOP – A Guide for NFU (Nat’l Farmers Union of England and Wales) Members, 
NAT.L FARMERS UNION OF ENG. AND WALES 1 (June 9, 2014), http://www.nfuonline.com/nfu-
gscop-members-brief/. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. at 12-13. 
 172. Groceries Code Adjudicator Bill, supra note 168, at cl. 2.  
 173. BRIDGET M. HUTTER & TOLA AMODU, RISK REGULATION AND COMPLIANCE: FOOD 
SAFETY IN THE UK 14-16 (Sept. 2008), available at 
http://www2.lse.ac.uk/researchAndExpertise/units/CARR/pdf/NCP04219.pdf. 
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tions within the confines of the law. By stating a broad provision for 
food safety and offering a due diligence defense, UK legislation encour-
ages the industry as a whole to step up to the plate and take responsibil-
ity for the products it sells. Furthermore, the UK responded to the dis-
parities of power between retailers and suppliers by introducing this 
code of practice.174 A similar approach encouraging flexibility and ac-
countability for retailers could be easily translated for application in the 
US. 
V. HOW UK STYLE REGULATION COULD WORK IN THE U.S. 
While the FSMA is ambitious and certainly represents a step to-
wards safer foods in the US, it does little to encourage efficient mainte-
nance of supply chains. The FSMA is overly specific and focuses on the 
individual links of the supply chain rather than recognizing the chain as 
a whole.175 Moreover, the FSMA creates exceptions for smaller entities 
in the food industry. Estimates indicate that once fully implemented, 
approximately 79% of produce growers in the US would be exempt 
from the FSMA’s provisions due to the Tester Amendment, which 
waives the requirements for farms making less than $500,000 on aver-
age annually and growers who sell more than half of their produce di-
rectly to consumers, retailers, or restaurants within a 275 mile radius of 
the farm.176 
While this provision may set small farmers’ minds at ease, it does 
little to actually protect the safety of the food supply; it actually creates 
more confusion. It is important to also note, however, that the 2% of 
farms making more than $1 million annually account for 53% of the to-
tal US production of farm goods and dominate production of fruits and 
vegetables.177 Farms making at least $5 million produce between 35% to 
45% of high-value crops, beef, and milk.178 The USDA’s report found 
that the majority of large and very large family farms were profitable 
 
 174. Adam Schoenborn, The Right to Retail: Can localism save Britain’s small retailers?, 
RESPUBLICA 22 (Apr. 2011), http://www.respublica.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Right-
to-retail.pdf. 
 175. See FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, supra note 70, § 106. 
 176. Helena Bottemiller, Nearly 80 Percent of Product Growers Will Be Exempt From New 
Food Safety Rule, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (Jan. 11, 2013), 
http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2013/01/nearly-80-percent-of-produce-growers-to-be-exempt-
from-new-food-safety-rule/#.U8zBCqgozkE. 
 177. ROBERT A. HOPPE & DAVID E. BANKER, STRUCTURE AND FINANCES OF U.S. FARMS: 
FAMILY FARM REPORT, 2010 EDITION, Economic Information Bulletin No. 66, at 9 (July 2010), 
available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/media/184479/eib66_1_.pdf [hereinafter USDA Report].  
 178. Id. at 9 (High value crops are vegetables, fruit, and nut trees).  
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businesses.179 Given that the majority of US produce comes from large 
farms operating profitably, it stands to reason that the burden of taking 
on more onerous safety standards is well placed. 
In contrast to the FSMA, neither Regulation 178/2002 nor the 
Food Safety Act of 1990 exempt producers from adhering to their 
rules.180 The broad language of both laws applies equally to all players 
in the food industry and encourages industry responsibility for safety 
and traceability while still providing for some government oversight. In 
particular, the UK’s Food Safety Act encourages retailers to maintain 
control of their own supply line; the Act’s due diligence defense re-
wards retailers for doing so. 
A. The Produce Industry’s Existing Supply Chain Management 
Mechanisms 
To improve the safety of fresh produce, the US should adopt the 
British model. The British co-regulation method takes a chain wide 
view of food safety and provides an open canvas for retailers to develop 
innovative ways to address the management of their supply chains with-
in the frame of liability. The US can easily adopt the system, especially 
considering that many of the pieces are already in place. Large US re-
tailers such as Kroger and Walmart already require suppliers to adhere 
to standards set by the Global Food Safety Initiative.181  Food safety 
agreements are also in place upstream in the supply chain. In the wake 
of the 2007 Earthbound farms spinach outbreak, California producers 
banded together to form the California Leafy Green Products Handler 
Marketing Agreement (“LGMA”), which sets out a science-based 
standard for producers of leafy greens to follow.182 Producers who satis-
fy the standard and maintain a trace-back system may use the LGMA 
licensed mark.183 With standards and initiatives such as these already in 
 
 179. Id. 
 180. See Commission General Food Law Regulation 178/2002; Council Regulation 
178/2002, art. 3 § 5. 
 181. The Kroger Co. Standard Vendor Agreement For Manufacturing Sourcing, KROGER, 11 
(Jan. 2013), http://www.thekrogerco.com/docs/default-document-library/standard-vendor-
agreement-for-manufacturing-procurement.pdf; Food Safety Requirements for Produce Suppliers, 
WALMART, (Mar. 2012), http://az204679.vo.msecnd.net/media/documents/food-safety-
requirements-for-produce-suppliers_130042261618354678.pdf. 
 182. Model Program: Experienced and Proven, CALIFORNIA LEAFY GREENS MARKETING 
AGREEMENT (LGMA), available at http://www.safeleafygreens.com (last visited Jan. 31, 2015). 
 183. California Leafy Green Products Handler Marketing Agreement, CAL. DEP’T OF FOOD 
AND AGRIC., available at http://www.lgma.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/LGMA-
marketing-agreement-03.08.pdf.  
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operation, the US could put in place the broad legislative language of 
the Food Safety Act of 1990 to incentivize strict management of retail 
supply chains. Like in the UK, the broad language and due diligence de-
fense would encourage large retailers to maintain control over their 
supply chains with limited government interference in exchange for the 
flexibility to determine their own approaches. 
B. Cost Allocation Across the Supply Chain 
Incidents of food borne illness outbreaks represent a negative ex-
ternality in the produce industry. Negative externalities occur when the 
actions of industry players have negative consequences for a third par-
ty.184 In the fresh produce supply chain, consumers experience this nega-
tive externality when they purchase or consume contaminated produce 
resulting from poor safety practices by industry players.185 This is a 
grossly unfair burden to place onto consumers who lack the necessary 
information to protect themselves and are thereby entirely reliant upon 
the retailer and its supply chain to deliver safe produce.186 The externali-
ty even extends past the individual consumers contracting the illnesses 
since it also places a preventable burden upon health services.187 Pro-
ducers and processors can correct this externality and alleviate the bur-
den on the consumer by ensuring better food safety. The expenses of 
proper safety procedures like keeping cattle out of leafy green fields or 
using clean wash water on the processing line should justifiably fall on 
producers and processors. The US government is not best situated to 
monitor compliance; rather, retailers who can identify their suppliers 
should be the ones managing them. While the US government do rec-
ognize a market failure in fresh produce,188 the FSMA may not be the 
best way to address it. The FSMA focuses far too much on the individu-
al links within the supply chain and not enough on the supply chain as a 
whole.189 
 
 
 184. Paul M. Johnson, “Externality,” A Glossary of Political Economy Terms, 
http://www.auburn.edu/~johnspm/gloss/externality (last visited Jan. 31, 2015).  
 185. Batz & Morris, supra note 112, at 2. 
 186. Dalusio, supra note 100, at 1083.  
 187. Annual Foodborne Illnesses Costs $77 Billion, supra note 58. 
 188. Humphrey, supra note 118, at 31. 
 189. FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, supra note 70, at § 106. 
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C. Cost on Retailers 
Chief among the concerns for implementing a co-regulation model 
in the US would be the cost on retailers to strictly maintain their supply 
chains. Supermarkets in the US operate on a slim profit margin; accord-
ing to one estimate, the margin is as low as 1.9%.190 Despite an industry 
average net profit margin of 2.4% as of 2014, major US grocery chains 
such as Kroger and Safeway posted more modest net profit margins of 
1.52% and 1.15% respectively.191 UK grocery chains Sainsbury and 
Tesco posted higher net profit margins: 2.99% and 3.01% respective-
ly.192 It is clear that even large retailers run the risk of cutting into al-
ready slim margins should they take on active management of supply 
chains. Requiring suppliers and producers to adhere to strict agricultural 
and handling practices could potentially raise the price of fresh produce. 
Another drastic consequence may be that instead of paying more for 
safer produce, retailers may simply stop carrying certain “risky” pro-
duce like some retailers did with fresh sprouts in the midst of the out-
break.193 A less drastic but more probable response may be to raise the 
sticker price of fresh produce; thereby pricing produce out of the gro-
cery budges of some consumers. In turn, this could lead to another 
negative externality—declining public health and the rising rates of 
obesity as consumer access to fresh produce becomes restricted. Ironi-
cally, a response geared towards improving public health could poten-
tially damage it further. 
This scenario, however, is highly unlikely. While UK supermarket 
profit margins are still higher than those of their US counterparts, their 
margins remain low; and yet, they are still able to co-regulate their sup-
ply chains.194 It is important to note how supermarkets make their profit. 
Supermarkets generally rely on high sales volume rather than mark ups 
to generate profit.195 The produce section is typically one of the most 
 
 190. The Reinvestment Fund, Understanding the Grocery Industry 10 (Sept. 30, 2011), 
available at 
http://www.cdfifund.gov/what_we_do/resources/Understanding%20Grocery%20Industry_for%2
0fund_102411.pdf. 
 191. Industry Browser—Services—Grocery Stores, YAHOO FINANCE, 
http://biz.yahoo.com/p/734conameu.html (last visited Aug. 29, 2014).  
 192. J Sainsbury PLC Financials, FINANCIAL TIMES (Aug. 29, 2014), 
http://markets.ft.com/research/Markets/Tearsheets/Financials?s=SBRY:LSE; Tesco PLC Finan-
cials, FINANCIAL TIMES, (Aug. 29, 2014), 
http://markets.ft.com/research/Markets/Tearsheets/Financials?s=TSCO:LSE.  
 193.  See, e.g., Weise, supra note 160. 
 194.  J Sainsbury PLC Financials, supra note 192.  
 195. Competition and Profit, FOOD MARKETING INSTITUTE (Aug. 2008), 
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profitable areas of the store196 and retailers tend to mark-up prices steep-
ly there. While some price mark-ups may be attributable to retailers 
guarding against damaged and rotten produce, much of the mark-ups 
may be for profit purposes.197 In addition to these considerations, prices 
for fresh produce change on a weekly basis and vary from region to re-
gion across the country.198 With mark ups and variances like these, the 
additional cost that co-regulation might place on retailers seems mini-
mal, moreover, it is unlikely that it will discourage customers from buy-
ing fresh produce. 
D. Cost on Producers and Suppliers 
The costs on producers and suppliers should also be taken into 
consideration. Farming in the US is still by and large a family industry 
with 98% of farms owned and operated by families.199 It is important to 
also recognize, however, that “family farm” does not necessarily imply 
the picturesque farm owned and operated by only Ma and Pa Kent. Of 
all the farms in the US, it is the 12% of family and nonfamily farms that 
produce approximately 84% of the value of production.200 Many of the 
largest farms in the nation are “family farms” that operate very profita-
bly201 and can certainly afford the cost of meeting safety standards. Ad-
ditionally, the costs associated with meeting safety standards appear to 
 
http://www.fmi.org/docs/facts-figures/competitionandprofit.pdf?sfvrsn=2. 
 196.  Supermarket Sales by Department—Percent of Total Supermarket Sales, FOOD 
MARKET INSTITUTE, http://www.fmi.org/docs/default-source/facts-figures/supermarket-sales-by-
department-2013.pdf?sfvrsn=2 (last accessed Aug. 31, 2014).   
 197.  This can be seen by comparing the terminal market price to the supermarket price of 
various produce items. The USDA’s Agricultural Marketing Service provides terminal market 
prices and supermarket prices. For example, the price of bananas on Feb. 28, 2014 at the Los An-
geles terminal market was on average $18.00 for 40 lb. cartons or $0.45/lb. USDA 
AGRICULTURAL MARKETING SERVICE, LOS ANGELES TERMINAL PRICES AS OF 28-FEB-2014, (Feb. 
28, 2014), available at  
http://search.ams.usda.gov/mnsearch/hiLiteText.aspx?i=11&docid=HC_FV01020140228.TXT. 
For clementines, the terminal market price for 3lb bags was $3.20/bag. Id. The average supermar-
ket price for the Southwest was $5.05/bag with a price range of $3.99 to $5.99. USDA 
AGRICULTURAL MARKETING SERVICE, NATIONAL FRUIT AND VEGETABLE RETAIL REPORT, (Feb. 
28, 2014), available at  
http://search.ams.usda.gov/mndms/2014/02/FV20140228WRETAIL.PDF#xml=http://search.ams.
usda.gov/mnsearch/hiliteinfo.aspx?i=3&docid=FV20140228WRETAIL.PDF The average super-
market price for bananas in the Southwestern US (including California) was $0.52/lb. Id.  
 198. See generally USDA AGRICULTURAL MARKETING SERVICE, NATIONAL FRUIT AND 
VEGETABLE RETAIL REPORT (Feb. 28, 2014).  
 199. USDA Report, supra note 177, at 6. 
 200. Id. at iv.  
 201. Id. at iv-v. 
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be slight. A study involving Texas citrus producers found that there was 
a cost of $11,385 or $2.11 per acre to achieve PrimusLabs and Euregap 
(the precursor to GLOBALG.A.P.) certification.202 When compared to 
the overall cost of regulation, $171,235,203 compliance with safety 
standards represented only 6.6%204 of regulatory expense to growers. 
State and federal regulations controlling air quality, water quality, and 
worker protection standards among other regulations added more ex-
pense.205 
Certain costs associated with certification are only one-time ex-
penses.206 For example, a study of Moroccan farms achieving Euregap 
certification found that 72% of the total cost to comply with the stand-
ard was nonrecurring.207 This indicates that the ongoing, annual cost to 
farmers complying with safety standards is less than the initial sticker 
price of the certification. With such a nominal amount added to the cost 
of production, continuing to allow the threat of food-borne illness to be 
exposed to consumers is untenable. However, it is also possible that 
even these slight increases to production may be too much for certain 
operations to bear and could amount to the proverbial straw that breaks 
the camel’s back as they cut into thin profit margins. 
Recognizing the burden of requiring small farms with limited re-
sources and slim profit margins to make changes in accordance with the 
FSMA, the Tester Amendment to the FSMA provides exemptions for 
small-scale farms that sell less than $500,000 per year and sell to stores 
within a 275-mile radius of the farm.208 This may be an appropriate con-
cession for small farmers whose produce is unlikely to be widely dis-
tributed and thereby unlikely to result in large-scale outbreaks of food-
borne illness. 
Nevertheless, the amendment fails to encompass the small farms 
that sell to co-ops, restaurants, and stores, a concern raised by agricul-
ture groups in a letter sent to the Senate Health, Education, Labor, and 
 
 202. Lynn Hamilton, Playing by the Rules: The High Cost of Regulation in California Agri-
culture, 16, (June 23-26, 2007). 
 203. Id. at 17.  
 204. Id. 
 205. See generally Hamilton, supra note 202. 
 206. Omar Aloui & Lahcen Kenny, The Cost of Compliance with SPS Standards for Moroc-
can Exports: A Case Study, 26, WORLD BANK, (2004), available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRANETTRADE/Resources/Topics/Standards/MoroccoCo
untrySurveyF.pdf.   
 207. Id. 
 208. FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, supra note 70, at 3893. 
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Pensions Committee.209 Consequentially, it is possible that contaminated 
food could reach a wider group of consumers than contemplated. A pos-
sible solution for this is to focus on the size of the retailer the farm sells 
to rather than the size of the farm itself. This approach would help pro-
tect consumers buying from retailers sourcing their produce from small, 
local farms by justifiably placing the safety burden on the small farms 
that choose to market their products to larger retailers. 
Alternatively, small farms may choose to follow in the footsteps of 
their British counterparts and adapt to the new regulatory landscape by 
forming cooperatives. Cooperatives would provide small farms the abil-
ity to pool resources and power, thereby giving them a stronger voice at 
the bargaining table with the more powerful retailers as well as the abil-
ity to access wider markets. In addition, the US could adopt a code of 
practice similar to the UK’s GSCOP to address the bargaining power 
disparities between suppliers and retailers. 
E. Informing Consumers about Standards 
Another problem to address is how to best communicate what the 
standard means to the shopping public. To be useful as both a public 
health tool and a way for the retailer to benefit from its investment in 
improving food safety, the consumer needs to know that the fresh pro-
duce they are buying is safe. Retailers could do this by developing 
marks and displaying them prominently in the produce section and or on 
the packaging. Marks, such as the Red Tractor logo in the UK, have 
been useful to consumers because it offers costumers an easy opportuni-
ty to know that the produce they are purchasing has been subject to 
safety standards and have traceability.210 To be useful, however, the 
consumer needs to not only recognize the mark but also understand 
what it means. Consumer comprehension is thus a necessary component 
to the success of an assurance scheme. 
Using marks on packaging, however, runs the risk of logo-
overload. Shoppers in the produce sections today are bombarded with 
the logos, marks, and labels of various groups; a customer may see the 
USDA’s organic label,211 various front-of-pack nutrition labels212, and 
 
 209. Helena Bottemiller, Food and Ag Groups Rally Against Tester Amendment. FOOD 
SAFETY NEWS (Nov. 16, 2010), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2010/11/food-and-ag-groups-
rally-against-tester-amendment/#.Uk4nutfn_IU. 
 210. ASSURED FOOD STANDARDS, RED TRACTOR LABELING AUDIT 6 (May 2012), 
http://www.redtractor.org.uk/documentdownload.axd?documentresourceid=65. 
 211. USDA, Labeling Organic Products, available at 
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other marks. Instead of clarification, the increased number of insignias 
the consumer needs to read and understand in order to make an in-
formed purchase could actually lead to confusion and frustration. Sains-
bury’s, for example, already pulled the Red Tractor logo, citing confu-
sion as one of the reasons.213 
One way to avoid overuse of labels may be to have retailers, sup-
pliers and producers, or even independent assurance schemes work to-
gether to develop a single mark for “their” system. By grouping the 
supply chain together, the consumer would only have to recognize and 
understand a few marks at a given retailer. Additionally, a single mark 
may also serve the symbolic purpose of uniting the disparate parts of the 
supply chain into a cohesive whole under one banner. The UK’s Policy 
Commission recommended getting the industry behind a single standard 
in order to streamline assurance schemes and avoid confusing consum-
ers.214 The Commission also proposed government funding to endorse 
the brand so that it can achieve recognition among consumers.215 
A similar scheme could work in the US if the industry and the 
government can unite behind a common assurance scheme that is easily 
recognizable and meaningful to consumers. A drawback to this pro-
posal, however, is that unlike the UK where the Red Tractor standard 
was already in use and recognized prior to 2002, no similar mark exists 
in the US.  Marks in the US are primarily labels to indicate whether 
foods are organic, non-GMO, or to detail a product’s nutritional value. 
To address the knowledge gap between consumers and the fresh pro-
duce industry, the industry, retailers in particular, need to introduce a 
food safety mark that consumers can readily recognize and understand. 
Alternatively, a mark for produce safety could follow in the same 
vein as the USDA organic mark. In 2002, the USDA’s National Organic 
program released their mark.216 A product meeting the statutory defini-
tions for “organic” per §205.303 of the Code of Federal Regulations, af-
ter being cleared as compliant by certifying agents,217  may display the 
 
http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSv1.0/getfile?dDocName=STELDEV3004446&acct=nopgeninfo. 
 212. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, FRONT-OF-PACKAGE NUTRITION RATING SYSTEMS AND 
SYMBOLS: PHASE I REPORT 51 (Ellen A. Wartella et al. eds., 2010).  
 213. Julia Glotz, Sainsbury’s dumps Red Tractor logo, GROCER (Oct. 16, 2012), 
http://www.thegrocer.co.uk/companies/supermarkets/sainsburys/sainsburys-dumps-red-tractor-
logo/233499.article.  
 214. FARMING & FOOD - A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE, supra note 135, at 40.  
 215. Id.  
 216. Certified Organic Label Guide, ORGANIC, 
http://www.organic.org/articles/showarticle/article-201 (last visited July 1, 2014).. 
 217. CFR § 205.303 (1990); and see CFR § 205.2. 
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mark.218 
The Swedish Keyhole also provides a useful example. The 
Livsmedelsverket (the Swedish National Food Agency) introduced the 
symbol in 1989 as a way to identify more nutritious foods to consumers 
and to encourage manufacturers to produce healthier products.219 The 
system is trademarked, but any manufacturer whose food meets the nu-
tritional requirements set forth by the Livsmedelsverket may display the 
symbol without notification.220 Recognition of the symbol is high ac-
cording to a study by the European Food Information Council.221 
Developing a mark or symbol to indicate that produce has met 
FSMA standards could be a cost effective way for the US government 
to address produce safety. Much like how Livsmedelsverket set nutri-
tional standards for the Keyhole,222 the US government could set forth 
standards governing produce safety. Supermarkets could then display 
the symbol in their produce section or on their store doors if their pro-
duce met the criteria. Certifying agencies or auditors could check to 
make sure the supply chain meets the standard, similar to the USDA or-
ganic system. 
Retailers could also release advertisements featuring the mark and 
describe what assurance scheme the retailer uses and how it protects the 
consumer. Such marks might even become a marketing tool for the re-
tailer as consumers become more comfortable and confident in what the 
mark represents. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Food safety in the US represents a growing concern as outbreaks 
of food-borne illnesses connected to fresh produce have become more 
frequent and large scale. Outbreaks indicate a failure on the part of the 
market to correct a negative externality that contains deadly conse-
quences. While US laws have attempted to address this, they focus my-
 
 218. See id.; see also Instruction: The Organic Certification Process, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. 
AND MARKETING SERV. NAT’L ORGANIC PROG. (Dec. 16, 2013), 
http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSv1.0/getfile?dDocName=STELPRDC5087109. 
 219. The Keyhole Symbol, LIVSMEDELSVERKET, http://www.slv.se/en-gb/Group1/Food-
labelling/Keyhole-symbol/ (last updated Feb. 25, 2007).  
 220. T. Lobstein & S. Davies, Defining and labelling ‘healthy’ and ‘unhealthy’ food, 12 PUB. 
HEALTH NUTRITION 331, 333 (2009).  
 221. Pan-European consumer research on in-store observation, understanding & use of nu-
trition information on food labels, combined with assessing nutrition knowledge, EUFIC, 
http://www.eufic.org/article/en/page/FARCHIVE/expid/pan-eu-study-nutrition-labelling-eufic-
forum-4 (last updated Jan. 29, 2015).  
 222. The Keyhole Symbol, supra note 219. 
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opically on the individual links of the supply chains that bring fresh 
produce to the tables of millions of Americans. Regulating the “link” 
level instead of the “chain” level can lead to a disjointed and ineffective 
approach. The US should instead take into serious consideration of us-
ing the co-regulation approach favored by the UK. This approach en-
courages retailers, the final link in the supply chain before produce 
reaches the ultimate consumer, to actively manage their supply chains 
from producers to processors by availing a due diligence defense. Re-
tailers have the opportunity to develop their own safety assurance pro-
grams or to subscribe to one of the many privately owned standards. It 
is evident that pieces of this system are already in place in the US where 
retailers use assurance schemes to help protect consumers. What is now 
missing is the legislative impetus to maintain the strictest of holds over 
supply chains. This approach not only requires minimum government 
input and expense, but would also enable the industry to address prob-
lems more swiftly and efficiently. 
 
